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INTRODUCTION 
Cons ide r  a n  economy i n  which a g e n t s  have d i f f e r e n t  l e v e l s  
of  i n f o r m a t i o n  c o n c e r n i n g  exogenous random e v e n t s .  How d o e s  t h e  
pooled  i n f o r m a t i o n  of  t h e  a g e n t s  g e t  r e v e a l e d  i n  t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  
exchange? I n  p a r t i c u l a r  what  i s  t h e  r o l e  p layed  i n  t h i s  by t h e  
p r i c e  system? A t  l eas t  s i n c e  Hayek t h i s  h a s  been a c e n t r a l  
problem i n  economics. "My main c o n t e n t i o n , "  Hayek w r o t e  i n  1937, 
will be that the tautologies, of which formal equilibrium 
analysis in economics essentially consists, can be turned 
into propositions which tell us anything about causation 
in the real world only insofar as we are able to fill those 
formal with definite statements about how 
knowledge is acquired and communicated ... The really 
central problem of economics as a social science, which 
we pretend to solve is how the spontaneous interaction of 
a number of people, each possessing only bits of knowledge, 
brings about a state of affairs in which prices correspond 
to costs, etc., and which could be brought about by de- 
liberate direction only by somebody who possessed the com- 
bined knowledge of all those individuals. Experience shows 
us that something of this sort does happen, since the em- 
pirical observation that prices do tend to correspond to 
costs was the beginning of our science. The only trouble 
is that we are still pretty much in the dark about (a) the 
conditions under which this tendency is supposed to exist 
and (b) the nature of the process1 by which individual 
knowledge is changed. 
' a u t h o r s '  emphasis  
The "man on the spot" cannot decide solely on the basis 
of his limited but intimate knowledge of the facts of his 
immediate surroundings. There still remains the problem of 
communicating t z 2 u c h  further information as he needs to fit 
his decisions into the whole pattern of changes of the larger 
economic system ... We must look at the price system as such 
a mechanism for communicating information if we want to under- 
stand its real function. 
One approach t o  t h i s  problem has  been t aken  v i a  t h e  n o t i o n  
of  a  " R a t i o n a l  Expec t a t i ons  Equi l ib r ium"  ( A . E . E . ) .  Since  ou r  
paper  i s  jux taposed  t o  t h e  R . E . E .  model, and meant t o  be a  
c r i t i q u e  o f  it ,  l e t  u s  f i r s t  b r i e f l y  r e c a l l  what t h e  R . E . E .  
* 
model is .  L e t  S be t h e  f i n i t e  s e t  o f  s t a t e s  o f  t h e  world.  For 
each  agen t  n  E N  l e t  I" be a  p a r t i t i o n  o f  S  r e p r e s e n t i n g  t h e  i n -  
* 
fo rmat ion  o f  n ,  and deno t e  by I t h e  c o a r s e s t  p a r t i t i o n  o f  S 
which r e f i n e s  each  I ~ ,  n  E N .  Trade t a k e s  p l a c e  i n  a  f i n i t e  se t  
L of commodities.  Thus t h e  space  of  s t a t e - c o n t i n g e n t  commodities 
LxS n  LxS  i s  IR, . Each a g e n t  n  i s  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by a  u t i l i t y  u  : IR, +1R 
T 2 T 
and an endowment en  EIR:~'. A s s u m e  un i s  C , s t r i c t l y  concave 
and monotonic,  and t h a t  en i s  measurable  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  I ~ .  
L Consider  a  p r i c e  f u n c t i o n  p  : S + R + .  I t s  i n v e r s e  y i e l d s  a  
p a r t i t i o n  of S  which w e  w i l l  deno te  by I ( p ) .  An R.E.E.  f o r  t h i s  
economy i s  a  p ,  a l ong  w i t h  a l l o c a t i o n s  xnE such  t h a t ,  f o r  
f 
n  E N ,  
n  (i) x  i s  measurable  w . r . t .  t h e  c o a r s e s t  r e f i nemen t  
1 ~ v . 1  ( p )  o f  1" and I (p )  ; 
n  (ii) x  Eargmax jun (x )  : x  i s  measurable  w . r . t .  InVI ( p ) ,  ) 
n  
and Ps xs 5 Ps * e  f o r  e ach  s E S  ; S i 
(Here, f o r  any v e c t o r  x  E R+ L LxS and s E S ,  xs is  t h e  v e c t o r  i n  R+ 
o b t a i n e d  by r e s t r i c t i n g  x . )  I n  words t h i s  means t h a t  each  a g e n t  
n  
n  r e f i n e s  h i s  i n fo rma t ion  I by what he  can  deduce from s e e i n g  p ,  
t h e n  forms h i s  demand x z  ( s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  budget  c o n s t r a i n t  
* 
W e  o u t l i n e  h e r e  t h e  model d e s c r i b e d  by Radner [7]. 
n  
ps Xs -5 ps e:) , and t h e  ensu ing  t o t a l  demand lxn  can be m e t  by 
t h e  supply  len a t  hand. Not ice  t h a t  p r i c e s  p l a y  t h e  d u a l  r o l e  
of s imul taneous ly  de t e rmin ing  t h e  budget c o n s t r a i n t  and r e v e a l i n g  
i n £  ormat ion.  Radner has  shown' t h a t  " g e n e r i c a l l y "  ( i n  t h e  space  
of u t i l i t i e s )  an R.E.E.  e x i s t s  and i t s  p r i c e s  a r e  f u l l y  r e v e a l i n g  
8 
i n  t h a t  I ( p )  = I . P r i c e s  a r e  t h u s  shown t o  convey t o  each agen t  
a l l  t h e  b i t s  o f  i n fo rma t ion  he ld  o r i g i n a l l y  i n  s e p a r a t e  minds. 
An immediate p a r a d o x i c a l  upshot  of  t h i s  was f i r s t  noted by 
Grossman and S t i g l i t z .  S ince  p r i c e s  r e v e a l  a l l  of t h e  c o l l e c t i v e  
i n fo rma t ion  a t  a  R . E . E . ,  no agen t  b e n e f i t s  from h i s  i n i t i a l  su-  
p e r i o r  in format ion!  And i f  t h i s  i n fo rma t ion  happens t o  be c o s t l y  
t o  a c q u i r e  t hen  no one w i l l  g a t h e r  any,  and t h e r e  w i l l  be  none 
f o r  p r i c e s  t o  r e v e a l .  
The paradox s t e m s  from a  g r i e v o u s  omiss ion i n  t h e  R.E.E.  
model. I t  does  n o t  even beg in  t o  d e s c r i b e  how, i n  t h e  f i r s t  p l a c e ,  
t h e  d i v e r s e  b i t s  of  i n fo rma t ion  of  t h e  a g e n t s  a r e  pooled and " p u t  
i n t o "  t h e  p r i c e s  t o  be r evea l ed .  .But, a s  Hayek emphasized, t h i s  
s t e p  i n  t h e  market process i s  t h e  c e n t r a l  i s s u e  i n  an  unders tand ing  
of  how in fo rma t ion  i s  d i s semina t ed  through t h e  economy. Our es- 
s e n t i a l  c r i t i c i s m  of t h e  R.E.E.  model i s  t h a t  it throws t h e  baby 
o u t  w i th  t h e  bath-water  because  it does  n o t  r e p r e s e n t  any such 
p r o c e s s  a t  a l l .  
I n  t h i s  paper  w e  c o n s i d e r  a  model w i t h  an e x p l i c i t  p r o c e s s  
f o r  t h e  f low of  i n fo rma t ion  v i a  p r i c e s .  Roughly it goes a s  fo l l ows .  
Economic a c t i v i t y  t a k e s  p l a c e  i n  t i m e  p e r i o d s .  Agents i n i t i a l l y  
a c t  on t h e  b a s i s  of  t h e i r  p r i v a t e l y - h e l d  i n fo rma t ion  1". Thi s  
r e s u l t s  i n  obse rvab l e  macro-economic outcomes (e.  g. p r i c e s )  th rough  
which t h e i r  i n fo rma t ion  i s  "be t r ayed" .  The e x t r a  i n fo rma t ion  s o  
r e l e a s e d  t o  everyone i s  then  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  t h e  n e x t  p e r i o d  of ac-  
t i v i t y .  Not ice  t h a t  i n  t h e  i n i t i a l  p e r i o d  a g e n t s  w i t h  s u p e r i o r  
in format ion  can e x p l o i t  it and make a  " k i l l i n g " .  The paradox t h a t  
i n fo rma t ion  i s  u s e l e s s  i s  removed by t h e  s imple  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  
p r o c e s s  t h a t  r e v e a l s  it t a k e s  t i m e  ( a s  any p roces s  m u s t ) .  
'and t h i s  i s  t y p i c a l  o f  r e s u l t s  ob t a ined  i n  o t h e r  s i m i l a r  
models ,  e . g .  t h o s e  o f  Grossman. 
This  d e s c r i p t i o n  i s ,  we b e l i e v e ,  more r e a l i s t i c  than  t h e  
R . E . E .  model (and a l s o  more i n  keeping wi th  what Hayek had i n  
mind) .  I t s  very  wording i n v i t e s  one t o  model it a s  a  s t r a t e g i c  
market game. We s h a l l ,  f o r  concre teness ,  choose one such: t h e  
Shapley-Shubik model of  exchange presen ted  i n  [ g l q  1 .  But our 
r e s u l t s  seem t o  be q u i t e  robus t  and no t  t o  hinge d e l i c a t e l y  on 
t h i s  cho ice  ( s e e  Remark ) ) . 
Before plunging i n t o  t h e  d e t a i l s  it might be h e l p f u l  t o  
n  d e s c r i b e  t h e  con tou r s  of our  model. S ,  N ,  { I  InEN a r e  a s  before .  
But now t h e r e  a r e  t i m e  p e r i o d s ,  f o r  s i m p l i c i t y  two. The charac-  
t e r i s t i c s  of t h e  t r a d e r s  must accord ing ly  be expanded i n t o  en- 
n  -n LxS i n  per iod  1 ,  2 ; and u t i l i t y  un : dowments e  , e  E IR + 
The game i s  b e s t  viewed i n  ex t ens ive  form. Nature moves 
f i r s t  t o  s e l e c t  a  s t a t e  s i n  S. A t  each node s a l l  t h e  p l a y e r s  
n  i n  N move s imul taneous ly  w i th  informat ion p a r t i t i o n s  given by I . 
Let x n ( s )  be t h e  set of'moves a v a i l a b l e  t o  n  a t  node s (of  cou r se ,  
we must then  r e q u i r e  t h a t  x n (  s)  is  c o n s t a n t  f o r  s E y E 1") . Put  
n  n  L X ( s )  = ll x n ( s ) .  There a r e  maps '9: : x ( s )  -+ Z , Y s  : x ( s )  +iR+ . 
nEN 
Here zn  i s  a  space of macro-economic observables  f o r  p l a y e r  n  
L 1 - ( i t s  b e s t  t o  t h i n k  of it a s  p r i c e s ,  and s e t  zn = E + )  For qs - 
1 N n  n  (q , , . .  . ,qs)  E X ( s )  , Y s  (qsa) i s  what n  observes  i n  Z a s  a  conse- 
n  quence of t h e  j o i n t  cho ice  qs of moves by t h e  agen t s ;  and Ys(qs) 
i s  h i s  f i n a l  holding of commodities i n  t ime per iod  1 .  Thus t h e  
n  n  n  
maps Y, s a t i s f y :  1 Y S  (qs)  = 1 es. I n  t ime-period 2 t h e  nodes 
nEN nEN 
i n  t h e  game tree a r e  qs E X ( S ) .  Let g n ( s )  be2 t h e  set of moves 
of n  a t  qs. The in format ion  p a r t i t i o n  in of n  on u X ( s )  i s  given 
sES 
by r e f i n e d  by what he can observe of  o t h e r s '  moves. To make 
t h i s  p r e c i s e ,  l e t  Tn  be t h e  p a r t i t i o n  of U X ( s )  t h a t  i s  y ie lded  
sES 
... n  n  by t h e  equiva lence  r e l a t i o n :  as qs ,  i f  p s  (qs)  = ps, (qs ,  ) . ~ l s o  
1 Without confus ion ,  N = { I ,  ..., N); S  = { 1 , . . . , S )  e t c .  
'1n gene ra l  w e  could w r i t e  ? (qs )  , b u t  t h i s  w i l l  n o t  be 
needed i n  ou r  model. 
e x t e n d  I" t o  a  p a r t i t i o n  on U X (s )  i n  t h e  o b v i o u s  way: t o  
sE S 
e a c h  y E 1" c o r r e s p o n d s  t h e  set  u X ( s ) .  Then d e f i n e  in = ~ : ~ ~ v ? ~ .  
sEy -n  L 
F i n a l l y  once  a g a i n  t h e r e  a r e  maps Y S  : 2 (s )  +W+ , where 2 (sl = 
TI g n ( s ) ,  which s p e c i f y  t h e  t r a n s f o r m a t i o n  o f  moves t o  t r a d e s  i n  
nEN 
t h e  2nd p e r i o d .  (of c o u r s e ,  1 ?: ( G S )  = 1 " f o r  any 
 EN  EN 
Gs E % ( s )  . I  
A s t r a t e g y  o f  n i s  t o  p i c k  a move a t  e a c h  node i n  s u U X ( S )  1, 
sES 
s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  c o n s t r a i n t  t h a t  t h e s e  be i d e n t i c a l  a t  any two nodes 
t h a t  l i e  i n  t h e  same i n f o r m a t i o n  set .  Given a c h o i c e  o f  strate-  
g i e s  by a l l  a g e n t s ,  a p l a y  n ( s )  i s  de te rmined  i n  t h e  t ree  f o r  
e a c h  s E S  i n  t h e  s t a n d a r d  manner. A s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  t h e s e  are moves 
- 
1 -. 1 --N qs - ( q s t . - .  '9s N ,  and Gs = (qs ,  . . . , qs)  i n  t h e  two t i m e  p e r i o d s .  
The f i n a l  h o l d i n g  t h a t  a c c r u e s  t o  n i s  t h e n  Y: (qs )  , ? ( 1  i n  
p e r i o d s  1 ,  2  i n  s ta te  s. H i s  payof f  is s imply  t h e  u t i l i t y  o f  h i s  
f i n a l  h o l d i n g :  un (1'4': (qS)  1 sEs , 19: (Gs )  1 
. 
W e  a n a l y z e  t h i s  game f o r  i t s  Nash E q u i l i b r i a  ( N .  E.  ) when t h e  
xn, i[", +n, '4'". ?" are a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  Shapley-Shubik model 
(see t h e  n e x t  s e c t i o n  f o r  d e t a i l s ) .  Our r e s u l t s  may be summed-up 
as  f o l l o w s .  I f  N i s  non-atdmic,  t h e n  f o r  a g e n e r i c  c h o i c e  o f  en,  
sn and un : N.E. e x i s t  and are f i n i t e  i n  number; t h e y  f u l l y  r e v e a l  
n S i n  t h a t  Q s ( q s )  # (P:, (Gs)  i f  s # s ' ;  and l e a d  t o  h i g h e r  u t i l i t i e s  
f o r  t h e  b e t t e r - i n f o r m e d  a g e n t s .  I f  N i s  f i n i t e  t h e n  g e n e r i c  r e -  
v e l a t i o n  f a i l s ,  and N .E .  e x i s t  r o b u s t l y  ( i . e .  f o r  an open set  o f  
n -n 
e , e and un)  a t  which some a g e n t s  do n o t  r e v e a l  t h e i r  informa- 
t i o n  i n  t h e  f i r s t  p e r i o d .  T h i s  l a s t  r e s u l t  depends  on t h e  p o s s i -  
b i l i t y  of  N.E .  which i n v o l v e  " t h r e a t s " .  I n  c o n t r a s t ,  when N i s  
non-atomic, " t h r e a t - e q u i l i b r i a "  can  be r u l e d  o u t .  A s  shown i n  
[ I t h e  s t r a t e g i e s  c a n  i n  t h i s  case be t a k e n  t o  depend on h i s t o r y  
o n l y  i n s o f a r  as  t h a t  h i s t o r y  r e v e a l s  something a b o u t  t h e  s t a t e  
of  n a t u r e .  Thus g e n e r i c  r e v e l a t i o n  by p r i c e s  i s  a phenomenon t h a t  
a t t a c h e s  t o  p e r f e c t  c o m p e t i t i o n  and i s  seen  t o  b r e a k  down i n  an 
o l i g o p o l i s t i c  s e t t i n g .  And -- t o  r e i t e r a t e  -- i n  b o t h  cases a g e n t s  
w i t h  s u p e r i o r  i n f o r m a t i o n  b e n e f i t  from it, s o  t h a t  w e  s t e e r  c l e a r  
o f  t h e  R.E .E .  paradox.  
One might  wonder i f  t h e s e  r e s u l t s  a r e  -- a t  bot tom -- an 
a r t i f a c t  o f  t h e  model w e  have invoked.  Could one n o t  concoc t  a n  
i n g e n i o u s  one-per iod  s t r a t e g i c  game whose N . E . ' s  c o i n c i d e d  w i t h  
t h e  R . E . E . ' s  o f  t h e  u n d e r l y i n g  economy? Such N . E . ' s  would e n t a i l  
t h a t  w h i l e  s t r a t e g i e s  a r e  measurab le  w . r .  t. I ~ ,  no one wishes  t o  
Nn 
r e v i s e  h i s  own even a f t e r  be ing  informed o f  t h e  r e s u l t a n t  I . 
They do  n o t  e x i s t  i n  o u r  model,  b u t  it i s  c o n c e i v a b l e  t h a t  i n  a  
s u f f i c i e n t l y  "complex" game t h e y  might .  Indeed one  s u g g e s t i o n  
i s  t o  a l l o w  e a c h  a g e n t  o f  t y p e  n  t o  submit  an  e n t i r e  demand func-  
t i o n  d  : IR; +lRL f o r  e v e r y  y E 1". The market  mechanism t h e n  p e r -  
-< 
forms a  compl ica ted  f i x e d  p o i n t  computa t ion  t o  f i n d  p r i c e s  t h a t  
c l e a r  marke t s  f o r  e v e r y  s E S .  Be ja  h a s  shown t h a t  t h i s  w i l l  n o t  
work: N . E . ' s  w i l l  be produced which a r e  n o t  R . E . E . ' s .  But even 
i f  some v a r i a n t  o f  t h i s  game d i d  work, it would be  open t o  t h e  
obv ious  c r i t i c i s m  t h a t  one  c a n n o t  imagine r e a l  a g e n t s  who have 
t h e  k i n d  o f  c a p a c i t y  o f  computa t ion  needed t o  p l a y  it. W e  t a k e  
a s  a  d ic tum - and t h i s  i s  m e t  by o u r  model - t h a t  b o t h  t h e  
s t r a t e g y - s e t s  and t h e  outcome map be  s imple  and " p l a y a b l e " .  Ih 
our model s t r a t e g i e s  a r e  n o t  c o n t i n g e n t  upon what w i l l  happen 
i n  t h e  m a r k e t ,  o n l y  upon t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  1" p r i v a t e l y  h e l d  by 
a g e n t s .  W e  b e l i e v e  t h a t  a s i g n i f i c a n t  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  a c t u a l  t r a d e  
t a k e s  p l a c e  t h i s  way. A fa rmer  o f f e r s  t o  t h e  marke t  h i s  c r o p  o f  
wheat ,  a s  a  m a t t e r  o f  p r i o r  commitment, no m a t t e r  what t h e  p r i c e  
i s  g o i n g  t o  be .  A t  t h e  t ime o f  p l a n t i n g  t h e r e  i s  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  
much i n f o r m a t i o n  f o r  p r i c e s  t o  r e v e a l :  demand d e c i s i o n s  w i l l  n o t  
be made u n t i l  much l a t e r .  Even a  system o f  c o n t i n u o u s - t r a d i n g  
f u t u r e s  m a r k e t s  c o u l d  n o t  hope t o  communicate a l l  t h e  r e l e v a n t  
i n f o r m a t i o n  a t  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  moment i n  t i m e .  It  i s  from t h e  
s p o t  p r i c e s  t h a t  t h e  fa rmer  t y p i c a l l y  l e a r n s  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  
which would have induced him t o  p l a n t  d i f f e r e n t l y  had he known 
it t h e n ,  and it is  t h e s e  p r i c e s  which a r e  h i s  most  r e l i a b l e  g u i d e  
t o  t h e  f u t u r e .  
Our h y p o t h e s i s  i s  t h a t  i n  many c a s e s  t h e s e  f u t u r e  marke t s  
do  n o t  e x i s t  anyway. Accord ing ly  w e  c o n s t r u c t  a  model i n  which 
t r a d e r s  l e a r n  from p a s t  s p o t  p r i c e s  and u n d e r t a k e  s i m p l e  t r a d i n g  
s t r a t e g i e s  t h a t  d e t e r m i n e  c u r r e n t  ones .  It  i s  b u i l t  i n  t h e  s p i r i t  
of Cournot .  And t h e  r e s u l t s  w e  o b t a i n  s e e m  t o  be  r o b u s t  t o  v a r i -  
a t i o n s  o f  t h e  model (Remark 1 ) .  
The model i s  s t r i p p e d  down t o  c o n c e n t r a t e  on t h e  f low of 
in format ion  from per iod  1 t o  2 .  Agents on ly  buy goods and a r e  
forced  t o  p u t  eve ry th ing  up f o r  s a l e .  The commodities i n  t h e  
two p e r i o d s  a r e  complete ly  d i s j o i n t  and t h e r e  i s  no inventory ing .  
A l l  t h i s  i s  f o r  s i m p l i c i t y  and could e a s i l y  be r e c t i f i e d  (Remark2) .  
A more s u b t l e  c o n d i t i o n  i s  on t h e  space of  u t i l i t i e s  w i t h i n  which 
our  g e n e r i c  r e s u l t  ho lds .  This  c o n s i s t s  of a l l  f u n c t i o n s  u ( x , % )  
de f ined  on t h e  j o i n t  ho ld ings  x , %  of p e r i o d s  1 , 2 .  One could w e l l  
a sk  how important  t h e  choice  of t h i s  space i s  f o r  our  r e s u l t s .  
I f  we had r e s t r i c t e d  o u r s e l v e s  t o  u ( x , % )  of t h e  form u (x+%)  then ,  
wi th  i nven to ry ing ,  t h i s  would i n  e f f e c t  make t h e  two t ime p e r i o d s  
a r b i t r a r i l y  c l o s e  t o  each o t h e r .  One might expec t  t h a t  t h e  agen t s  
would t r a d e  very l i t t l e  i n  t h e  f i r s t  pe r iod  and simply wa i t  u n t i l  
t h e  second pe r iod  when they  had more in format ion  t o  do most of 
t h e i r  t r a d i n g .  The r e s u l t i n g  N . E . ' s  might then  look very much 
l i k e  t h e  R . E . E . ' s .  A s  we show l a t e r  i n  an example, however, t h i s  
i n t u i t i o n  i s  wrong. Agents w i l l  t r a d e  i n  bo th  t ime p e r i o d s  be- 
cause  t h e  p r i c e s  w i l l  i n  g e n e r a l  be d i f f e r e n t .  And t h e  main 
r e s u l t  of our  pape r -  t h a t  in format ion  i s  of va lue  - would n o t  
be v i o l a t e d .  
The paper  i s  organized  a s  fo l lows .  I n  Sec t ion  2 t h e  b a s i c  
s t r a t e g i c  market game i s  formulated.  I n  Sec t ion  3 t h e  main 
theorem i s  proved. I n  Sec t ion  4 a  s e r i e s  of examples i s  presen- 
t e d  t o  "round o f f "  t h e  approach. A s  we mentioned e a r l i e r ,  i f  N 
i s  f i n i t e  then  in format ion  may n o t  be r evea l ed  a t  an N.E.  We 
a l s o  model t h e  s i t u a t i o n  i n  which in format ion  may be bought and 
s o l d ,  and i n  t h i s  c a s e  it i s  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  no N.E. e x i s t s .  Fin- 
a l l y ,  an excurs ion  i s  made i n t o  a  Betrandian-type of model i n  
which p r i c e s  can be used a s  ( c o n t i n g e n t )  s t r a t e g i e s .  But i n s t e a d  
of being f u n c t i o n s  they  a r e  kep t  very s imple ,  a s  i s  t h e  outcome 
map, i n  accordance wi th  t h e  dictum s t a t e d  e a r l i e r .  We f i n d  t h a t  
aga in  no N.E.  may e x i s t ;  i f  it does  ( a )  more than  one p r i c e  
may p r e v a i l  f o r  a  commodity (b) in format ion  i s  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  
r evea l ed  i f  N i s  f i n i t e  ( c )  agen t s  t y p i c a l l y  b e n e f i t  from super-  
i o r  in format ion  ( N  f i n i t e  o r  continuum).  
2 .  THE STRATEGIC MARKET GAME 
Cons ide r  t h e  c a s e  when t h e  agen t - space  i s  non-atomic. '  For  
convenience  t h e r e  i s  a  f i n i t e  number o f  t y p e s  o f  a g e n t s :  1 ,  ..., N .  
Type n  c o n s i s t s  o f  t h e  continuum ( n - l , n ]  endowed w i t h  t h e  Lebesque 
measure f o r  e v e r y  n E N  = { I ,  ..., N). (The t r i p l e  u s e  o f  n: a s  t h e  
t h  
number n ,  as t h e  set  ( n - l , n ] ,  a s  t h e  name o f  t h e  n  t y p e ;  as 
w e l l  a s  t h e  a d d i t i o n a l  f o u r t h  u s e  of  N a s  t h e  se t  of t y p e s  
{ l ,  ..., N); shou ld  c a u s e  no c o n f u s i o n .  The usage  w i l l  a lways be  
c l e a r  from t h e  c o n t e x t ,  and it s a v e s  enormously on n o t a t i o n . )  
To r e c a p i t u l a t e  from S e c t i o n  1 :  
L r { I ,  ..., L) - set  of  commodities 
S  F { I ,  ..., S )  s ta tes  o f  n a t u r e  
e n € m +  LxS 2 endowment of  a  E  (n-1 .n ]  i n  p e r i o d  1  
6" E  IR :XS 2 endowment of  a  E (n-1 , n ]  i n  p e r i o d  2  
n  LxS 
u  :IR+ LXS . =+ + I R ~ u t i t i t ~  f u n c t i o n  of a ~  (n-1 ,n l  
In 5 p a r t i t i o n  o f  S  2 i n f o r m a t i o n  o f  a  E (n-1 , n ]  
LxS x JR txS w i l l  be broken i n t o  ( x , i )  where x , i  are A v e c t o r  i n  IR+ 
e a c h  i n  IR, LxS.  Thus x ( i )  i s  t h e  v e c t o r  o f  s t a t e - c o n t i n g e n t  com- 
LXS m o d i t i e s  i n  p e r i o d  1  ( 2 )  . Also f o r  x  E IR+ , Xes i s  i t s  component 
L  S  on t h e  a x i s  ( g . s )  E L  x S; and x  ( x  ) i s  t h e  v e c t o r  i n  IR+(IR+)  
s R 
o b t a i n e d  by r e s t r i c t i n g  x .  
The L~~ commodity i s  s i n g l e d  o u t  as a money t o  be  used  f o r  
n  n  n  p u r c h a s e s .  For  s E  S f  l e t  gLs = rnin ] eLs, : S '  E  I (sl 1 . (Here 
In(s)  i s  t h e  e lement  of  In t h a t  c o n t a i n s  s .)  Then x a ( s ) ,  t h e  set  
of moves a v a i l a b l e  t o  d a t  s i n  p e r i o d  1 ,  i s  g i v e n  by: 
 he model f o r  N f i n i t e  w i l l  become c l e a r  i n  t h e  p r o c e s s .  
where L-1 i s  t h e  s e t  { I ,  ..., L-1) and n ( a )  i s  t h e  type  of a .  I n  
a  t h e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  bRs i s  t h e  amount of money b i d  by a  i n  p e r i o d 1  
i n  s t a t e  s f o r  t h e  purchase of commodity R E L - 1 .  A choice  of 
L 
moves {b: : a  E [ O f N ] }  determines  p r i c e s  pQS and t r a d e s  x: ER+ by 
t h e  r u l e s :  1 
f o r  R EL-1 ;  
This  completely s p e c i f i e s  t h e  maps {I: : a  E  [ O , N ] .  s E s}. I t  
simply says  t h a t  a l l  of t h e  goods i n  L-1 have t o  be o f f e r e d  f o r  
s a l e  and then  t h e  goods (money) a r e  d i sbursed  i n  p ropor t ion  t o  
t h e  b i d s  ( o f f e r s ) .  The s e t s  i (a (s )  and t h e  maps ?: a r e  de f ined  
a  0. a rep laced  by i n  e x a c t l y  t h e  same way a s  x a ( s ) ,  Y s  with bQsf  e Q s  
&is, cis. I t  remains t o  d e s c r i b e  in, e q u i v a l e n t l y  f n ,  t o  com- 
p l e t e  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  of t h e  ex tens ive  game. Since we a r e  i n t e r -  
e s t e d  i n  t h e  r o l e  played by p r i c e s  i n  d i ssemina t ing  informat ion ,  
we s h a l l  l e t  p r i c e s  be observable ,  i . e . ,  Z" = m y '  ( t h e  p r i c e  
of t h e  L~~ commodity being always 1 i n  our model) ,  and t h e  R t h  
n 
N 
component of 'Ps (bs)  = ( JoNb:sdaj/(jo eisda] . However, from t h e  
'We cons ide r  on ly  t h e  case  when t h e  map a + b :  i s  i n t e g r a b l e .  
See Remark 2, however. 
t e c h n i c a l  poin t -of -v iew o f  t h e  v a l i d i t y  o f  o u r  theorem,  much 
f i n e r  o b s e r v a t i o n s  can be p e r m i t t e d ,  a s  e x p l a i n e d  i n  Remark3 .  
L e t  u s  d e s i g n a t e  t h e  above game by r .  W e  w i l l  a n a l y z e  t h e  
Nash Equilibria ( N . E . )  o f  r ,  i . e . ,  a  c h o i c e  of  s t r a t e g i e s  by t h e  
a g e n t s  i n  [O,N] a t  which no one a g e n t  can p r o f i t  by a  u n i l a t e r a l  
d e v i a t i o n .  
3 .  EXISTENCE OF NASH E Q U I L I B R I U M  
r has  some t r i v i a l  " i n a c t i v e "  N . E . ' s .  For i n s t a n c e  cons ide r  
t h e  s t r a t e g i e s  i n  which a l l  agen t s  b id  zero  everywhere. Addi- 
t i o n a l  N . E . ' s  can be cons t ruc t ed  which l e a v e  any s p e c i f i e d  sub- 
s e t  of t h e  2 x L - 1  x S  t r ad ing -pos t s  i n a c t i v e .  Our i n t e r e s t  i s  
i n  pinning down c o n d i t i o n s  which guaran tee  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  of a c t i v e  
N.E. ' s t  namely those  which produce p o s i t i v e  p r i c e s  i n  each t r a d i n g  
pos t .  Indeed,  from now on, we s h a l l  always mean an a c t i v e  N.E. 
when we say N.E. 
I t  t u r n s  o u t  t h a t  N . E . ' s  do n o t  always e x i s t  f o r  I'. However 
i f  we va ry  r t hen ,  f o r  a  "gener ic"  choice  of r ,  it can be shown 
t h a t  N . E . ' s  do e x i s t .  Le t  u s  f i r s t  make t h e  no t ion  of  g e n e r i c i t y  
p r e c i s e .  Let  A ,  B ,  C ,  D be p o s i t i v e  numbers wi th  A < B ,  C < D .  
1 N N x L x S  x R~~~~~ c o n s i s t i n g  of e  , . . . , e  , Consider t h e  polytope E i n  R+ 
- 1 -N 
e  ,..., e  which s a t i s f y :  
-n (i) A < e ; s t e L s < ~  , f o r  n E N  and s E S  
(ii) C < 1 e i S  < D f o r  R E L - 1  and s E S  . 
 EN 
Each p o i n t  i n  E r e p r e s e n t s  a  cho ice  of endowments e , g .  C l e a r l y  
we can f i n d  an E > 0 such t h a t  max I l l  1 enll , I 1  1 Z"II 1 < E where 11 11 
nEN nEN 
1 - 1 -N denotes  t h e  maximum norm. Then i f  x  , . . . ,xN , x  , . . . , x  rs o, +(L.-$ m.nefr;L 
1 41N 
r e a l l o c a t i o n  of e  , . . . , e N t  ?il ,. . . , e  E E ,  we au toma t i ca l ly  have 
7 
x < E , 1 I < E.  Thus i f  endowments a r e  t o  come from E we c a n ,  
con f ine  o u r s e l v e s  t o  u t i l i t i e s  de f ined  o n t h e  cube C C R +  L x s  exs 
whose edges have l e n g t h  E .  Let  U be t h e  space of a l l  f u n c t i o n s  
2 de f ined  on a  neighborhood 4 of C which a r e  C , s t r i c t l y  concave, 
and s a t i s f y  ( f o r  0 < a  < a ' )  : 
2 With t h e  C - topology,  U i s  a  Banach manifold.  A p o i n t  i n  U N 
r e p r e s e n t s  a  cho ice  of u t i l i t i e s  f o r  t h e  N types .  We w i l l  keep 
a l l  t h e  o t h e r  d a t a  of t h e  game f i x e d  a s  i n  Sec t ion  2 ,  and vary 
on ly  t h e  endowments and u t i l i t i e s .  E x uN can t hen  be thought  o f  
a s  t h e  space  of  games. Our e x i s t e n c e  theorem i s  now r e a d i l y  
s t a t e d .  
Theorem. There i s  an open dense  set  D i n  E l  whose complement 
i n  E has  z e r o  L e b e s - u e  measure, such t h a t  f o r  (e,G) E D  t h e r e  $ 
e x i s t s  an open dense  set D ( e . 6 )  i n  uN wi th  t h e  p r o p e r t y :  
(i) N . E . ' s  e x i s t  and a r e  f i n i t e  i n  number 
f o r  r E { ( e , 6 )  1 x D(e ,6 )  
L-'*Sis t h e  move a t  any N . E .  i n  ( i ) ,  (ii) i f  b  : [ O , N ]  + IR+ 
t hen  b  i s  f u l l y  r e v e a l i n g ,  i . e .  
The proof c o n s i s t s  o f  t h r e e  s t e p s .  W e  w i l l  d e f i n e  a  "po- 
t e n t i a l  Nash Equi l ib r ium"  (p.N.E.) which e x i s t s  f o r  eve ry  r = 
( e , 6 ,  u )  E E x u N  ( S e c t i o n  3.1 ) . Then w e  d e f i n e  D and prove t h a t  
i f  ( e r e )  E D  t h e r e  i s  an open dense  D ( e , 6 )  i n  uN such t h a t  every  
p.N.E. of  r E ( e , 6 )  x D ( e , Z )  i s  f u l l y  r e v e a l i n g  ( S e c t i o n  3 . 2 ) .  
From t h i s  it i s  deduced t h a t ,  f o r  such T I  t h e  set  of  p.N.E. = 
t h e  set  of N.E. ( S e c t i o n  3 . 3 ) .  
3.1 P o t e n t i a l  Nash E q u i l i b r i a  
N * F i x  I ' =  ( e u )  i n  E x U  . The fictitious game r i s  ob ta ined  
from I' by t h e  m o d i f i c a t i o n s :  (i) t h e  i n fo rma t ion  p a r t i t i o n  Z n  
1  
of each  t ype  i n  p e r i o d  2 i s  r ep l aced  by I . . .v (id.L.0.g. 
* 
assume t h a t  I I V  . . . V I ~  = I = ( l . . . S )  from now on j 
(ii) s t r a t e g i e s  a r e  r e s t r i c t e d  t o  be b i d s  c o n t i n g e n t  only on t h e  
i n fo rma t ion  about  chance moves and n o t  c o n t i n g e n t ,  beyond t h i s ,  
on o t h e r s '  moves, i . e . ,  g a ( b ( s ) )  = g a ( b '  ( s ) )  f o r  b ( s )  , b l  (s )  E X ( s ) .  
* 
For A > O  c o n s i d e r  t h e  A-modified fictitious game r A  i n  which 
( i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  (i) and (ii)) an e x t e r n a l  agency i s  imagined t o  
have p l aced  b i d s  o f  s i z e  A i n  each of  t h e  2 (L-1)s  t r ad ing -pos t s .  
* 
Thi s  does  n o t  a f f e c t  t h e  s t r a t e g y  sets of r b u t  o n l y  t h e  s t r a t e g y -  
to-outcome map. 
A p o t e n t i a l  Nash E q u i l i b r i u m  (p.N.E.) of  I' i s  s imply  an  N.E. 
* 
of  r . I f  q ( r A )  d en o t e s  t h e  set  of  N . E .  of T A ,  t h e n  c l e a r l y  
* 
P . N . E .  of r = n ( r 0 ) .  
* 
L e t  1" denote  t h e  s t r a t e g y - s e t  of t y p e  n  i n  t h e  game T A ,  
A - > 0. A t y p i c a l  e lement  o f  In c o n s i s t s  of a  p a i r  of v e c t o r s  
* 
bn, 6" i n  IR + L-l x S  measurable  w . r .  t .  1". I r e s p e c t i v e l y .  S ince  
u t i l i t i e s  a r e  s t r i c t l y  concave,  and t h e  set  of a g e n t s  [ O , N ]  i s  
* 
non-atomic, it i s  obvious  t h a t  a t  any N.E. of T A  a g e n t s  o f  a  
g iven  t y p e  u se  t h e  same s t r a t e g y .  T he re fo r e  i n  o u r  a n a l y s i s  o f  
* 
n ( r A )  w e  may r e s t r i c t  o u r s e l v e s  t o  t h e  set 1 = 1' x . . . x lN. 
For  y > 0  deno te  by 1 t h e  s u b s e t  of 1 a t  which a l l  p r i c e s  v 
PRSI %s ( R E L - ~ , s E S )  i n  t h e  two p e r i o d s  a r e  a t  l e a s t  u .  
Lemma I .  There i s  a  u > 0  such t h a t  i f  r E E x uN 
* 
t h e n  q ( r A )  c I,, f o r  A - > 0. 
P roof .  F i r s t  l e t  u s  show t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a  y* such t h a t  i f  
* b  
t h e  f i r s t  p e r i o d  moves a t  some N.E.  of  r A  a r e  b ,  t hen  pRs > p ,  
L 
f o r  a l l  s , L .  (By p;S w e  mean t h e  f i r s t - p e r i o d  p r i c e s  t h a t  a c c r u e  
from b  i n  t h e  game rX. 
Case 1  
f o r  some n E N  and s E S .  
o( I f  an a g e n t  of  t y p e  n  i n c r e a s e s  h i s  b i d s  b  R r  ( r  E I n ( s )  
by & > O  t h e n  t h e  i n c r e a s e  i n  h i s  p a y o f f ,  f o r  sma l l  &,  i s  approx- 
i m a t e l y :  
f o r  any r E I n ( s ) .  T h i s  must be non -pos i t i ve ,  t h e r e f o r e  
Case 2 
- 
n 1 biS - e f o r  some  EN and s € S  . 
a a -  L -L s 
C l e a r l y  pb > en /qR f o r  any r € In (s )  , where e a b b r e v i a t e s  ?,r - -LS- R r  
n 1 eRr.  Cons ide r  q € I n ( s l )  f I n ( s ) .  P u t  
nEN 
n ' M-min R  ISLs1 /eRr : n 1  E N ,  r E I n ,  ( s t )  , s 1  E S  I 
oi 
I f  an  a g e n t  o f  t y p e  n  r e d u c e s  b:, by E and i n c r e a s e s  b R r l  by 
c ( r € I n ( s )  , r ~ 1 ~ s ' ) )  t h e n  h i s  i n c r e a s e  i n  payoff  f o r  s m a l l  c  
i s  approx imate ly :  
f o r  any r '  € I n ( s l ) .  T h i s  must  a l s o  be n o n - p o s i t i v e ,  t h u s  
P u t  M = min { M ~  : ReL-l} and t h e n  u 1  = rnin { o / ~ o '  , M I  M / s ~ ~ J .  
* b 
Combining t h e  two c a s e s ,  w e  have shown: b  E ~ ( I ' ~ )  =+ p > u l  f o r  
a l l  R and s. I n  a n  e x a c t l y  ana logous  manner, one c a n  check t h a t  
t h e r e  i s  a  u 2  > 0 such t h a t  i f  a r e  t h e  second-per iod  moves a t  
any N.E .  of I'; t h e n  p' ( 2 )  > u2 f o r  a l l  R and s. Then, w i t h  Rs 
u = rnin { p 1 , p 2 ) ,  t h e  lemma f o l l o w s  ( r e c a l l  t h e  bounds on endow- 
ments  i n  E ) .  
* N 
L e m m a  2 .  I f  A > O ,  t h e n  n ( I '  ) i s  non-empty f o r  any r € E x U  . A 
P r o o f .  I f  A > 0 t h e  s t r a t e g i e s - t o - o u t c o m e  map i s  c o n t i n u o u s .  
* ( I t  blows up i f  A = 0,  i . e .  i n  t h e  unmodif ied f i c t i t i o u s  game T O  
a t  s t r a t e g i e s  which produce  a  z e r o  p r i c e  i n  any t r a d i n g - p o s t  ... 
hence t h e  impor tance  o f  Lemma 1 . )  The proof  now i n v o l v e s  a  
s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d  u s e  of  K a k u t a n i f s  f i x e d  p o i n t  theorem.  
* N 
L e m m a  3. q ( T  ) i s  non-empty f o r  any r E E x U  . 
P r o o f .  Take a  sequence  {arn}, am - O + .  L e t  mb,mg E 11 ( r  1 ,  
am 
m * (By Lemma 2  s u c h  b I m g  e x i s t . )  L e t  b , * ~  b e  a  c l u s t e r - p o i n t  of  
*b -,*g 
t h e  ~ ~ b , ~ h ) .  By Lemma 1 ,  P R s '  P R s  >1-1>0 f o r  REL-1 and S E S .  
* * -. 
Then b ,  b  i s  a  p o i n t  of c o n t i n u i t y  of t h e  pay-off f u n c t i o n s ,  
* * 
from which it e a s i l y  f o l l o w s  t h a t  b  * E q ( ) . 
3.2 G e n e r i c  F u l l  R e v e l a t i o n  Bv P r i c e s  
L e t  u s  f i r s t  d e s c r i b e  t h e  set  V i n  E .  Though it r e q u i r e s  
somewhat l a b o u r e d  n o t a t i o n ,  t h e  i d e a  is s imple .  For  y  E con- 
s i d e r  &&-I)-dimensional s implex  of moves Rn a v a i l a b l e  t o  n  i n  
'n p e r i o d  1 .  Suppose (i) t h e r e  e x i s t  y , , y , E I  which o n l y  n  can  
I L 
n d i s t i n g u i s h ,  i .e .  , yl  u y 2  E 1' f o r  j  E ~ \ { n } ;  (ii) e i s  c o n s t a n t  
t S 
o v e r  s E y l  u y 2  I f  a t  an  N.E.  of  fr it happens t h a t  n  i s  a t  t h e  
same " v e r t e x "  of  R; I Rn , e .g .  b i d d i n g  n o t h i n g  i n  b o t h  y l  Y. 
and y 2 ,  t h e n  i r r e s p ' e c t i v e  %f t h e  s t r a t e g i e s  used  by o t h e r s  o n l y  
y1 u y 2  w i l l  be r e v e a l e d  a t  t h e  s t a r t  of  p e r i o d  2. There  i s  n o t h i n g  
i n  t h e  model t o  s t o p  such N . E . ' s  from e x i s t i n g  r o b u s t l y  ( i n  u t i l -  
N i t i e s ,  i . e . , f o r  an  open se t  i n  U ) .  Thus w e  w i l l  r e q u i r e  t h a t  
endowments be  i n  " g e n e r a l  p o s i t i o n , "  s o  t h a t  i f  any s u b s e t  of  
p l a y e r s  i s  a t  v e r t i c e s  t h e n  t h e i r  i n f o r m a t i o n  i s  s t i l l  r e v e a l e d .  
To make t h i s  p r e c i s e  u n f o r t u n a t e l y  c a l l s  f o r  q u i t e  cumbersome 
n o t a t i o n .  
For y  €1" l e t  t h e  z e r o - v e r t e x  of Rn be deno ted  by V ~ Y )  and 
Y 
t h e  remain ing  L-1 ( c o r r e s p o n d i n g  t o  p u t t i n g  a l l  b i d s  on some 
n  n  R EL-1) by v l  ( y )  , . . . ,vL-l ( y )  . Cons ide r  T" c i v y  ( y )  , . . . , v E ( y )  1,T;ln f Y 
and d e f i n e :  
tn = r e l a t i v e  i n t e r i o r  of t h e  convex h u l l  of  v e r t i c e s  i n  T" . Y Y 
L e t  r n  = { ~ f :  : y E I"} be  a  c o l l e c t i o n  of  s u b s e t s  of  v e r t i c e s  of 
n  Rn y € 1  . A c h o i c e  of moves bn E R; by t y p e  n  i s  of t y p e  r n  
Y Y E P  
i f  b n E ? "  f o r  a l l  ~ € 1 " .  
Y Y 
1  Given r  = ( T  , ,  r N  f u r t h e r  d e f i n e :  
1  N (iii) b  = ( b  , . . . , b  ) i s  of t y p e  r  i f  each  bn i s  of  t ype  r n .  
( i v )  A ( T )  = a c t i v e  p l a y e r s  i n  r  =  EN: J T " I  > I  f o r  some Y E I " }  Y 
n  ( v )  For  n  E A ( T )  , R a ( r )  = a c t i v e  s t r a t e g i e s  of n  i n  
n  
T = n { l y :  I T ~ J > I I  
en ( v i )  i(;(r) = n{Ty : I T ?  > ( , V;(Y) €Tn} 
.. n  n  ( v i i )  R , ( T )  = n i l n  : I T ~ I  > I , v L ( y )  +T;} 
n  en .. n  (Note: R a ( r )  = R a ( r )  x R a ( r ) )  
1  N ( v i i i l  Rp ( r )  = { b  = ( b  , . . . , b  ) : b  i s  a  f e a s i b l e  c h o i c e  of  
moves i n  p e r i o d  1 ,  b  is  of  t y p e  T ,  pis > p f o r  
By d ropp ing  i n a c t i v e  s t r a t e g i e s ,  R , , ( r )  c an  be - and w i l l  be - 
n  P 
viewed a s  a  s u b s e t  o f  R a ( r ) .  
nEA(r)  
By Lemma 1  w e  can  c o n f i n e  o u r s e l v e s  t o  t h e  set  { ( b , i )  : 
* bE U R ( r )  i n  t h e  s e a r c h  o f  N .E .  of I? . Observe t h a t  U i s  a  
r  1-I r  
f i n i t e  p a r t i t i o n .  Also  s i n c 6  t h e  moves-to-outcome map Y i s  con- 
t i n u o u s  a t  p o s i t i v e  p r i c e s ,  it i s  uni fo rmly  con t i nuous  onUR ( T I .  
r  1-I 
T h e r e f o r e  w e  can  f i n d  ( s u f f i c i e n t l y  s m a l l )  neighborhoods ?n of 
-Y 
f?" i n  { A f f i n e  h u l l  o f  such t h a t  Y ( d e f i n e d  by t h e  same fo rmulas )  
Y Y 
i s  c o n t i n u o u s  on I I { T n : \ T n ~ > I }  and t h e  i m a g e o f  II I I ( . . . )  
nEA ( r  ) -Y nEA ( r  
i 
under  y i s  c o n t a i n e d  i n  2 .  Now d e f i n e  s:, R" ( T )  , 3 ( r )  , R ( T )  ex- 
-a -1-I 
* n  
a c t l y  a s  b e f o r e  by u s i n g  tn i n  p l a c e  of  TY. W e  w i l l  c o n s i d e r  
-Y 
t h e  r-subgame d e f i n e d  on t h e  p l a y e r s  i n  A ( r ) , ' e a c h  of whom h a s  
t h e  s t r a t e g y - s e t  R; (TI , i . e .  a l l  i n a c t i v e  s t r a t e g i e s  a r e  h e l d  
- -  
' ~ e c a l l  t h a t  i s  t h e  neighborhood of  C on which u t i l i t i e s  a r e  
d e f i n e d .  
i 
f i x e d  and Y i s  a p p l i e d  t o  o n l y  t h e  a c t i v e  s t r a t e g i e s  o f  t h e  
* n  p l a y e r s  i n  A ( r ) .  These a c t i v e  s t r a t e g i e s  now v a r y  o v e r  ry i n -  
s t e a d  of  ?; b u t  t h i s  c a u s e s  no problems.  The N . E .  o f  t h e  r -  
subgame s t i l l  l i e  i n  Rp ( r )  C I'I R ( r  by Lemma 1 , w i t h  ,u lowered 
n ~ ~ ( r ) - ~  
s l i g h t l y  t o  a l l o w  f o r  t h e  e x t e n s i o n  o f  t h e  s t r a t e g i c  domain from 
?" t o  ?". Def ine :  
Y -Y 
b  M ( r )  = { b ~ ~ ~ ( r )  : pb s I = p s l  f o r  two d i s t i n c t  s and s '  i n  S}. 
M ( T )  depends  on e. W e  w i l l  say  t h a t  e i s  i n  g e n e r a l  p o s i t i o n  i f  
M ( T )  i s  a  f i n i t e  union o f  submani fo lds  o f  codimension a t  l e a s t  
one  i n  R ( r ) ,  f o r  a l l  r .  Then t h e  set  
-1.I 
{ e  : e i s  i n  g e n e r a l  p o s i t i o n )  
NxLxS by removing a f i n i t e  number o f  submani- i s  o b t a i n e d  from I R +  
f o l d s  of  codimension a t  l eas t  one i n  I R +  NxLxS.  ~ e t  
D = { ( e , S )  E E  : e i s  i n  g e n e r a l  p o s i t i o n }  . 
C l e a r l y  D s a t i s f i e s  a l l  t h e  p r o p e r t i e s  r e q u i r e d  by t h e  theorem. 
To p rove  (ii) o f  t h e  theorem it w i l l  s u f f i c e  t o  show t h a t  t h e r e  
i s  an open dense  . s e t  0 ( r  , e r g )  i n  u A  ('I ( f o r  ( e , S )  E D )  such t h a t :  
i f  u 6 0  ( r , e , i )  t h e n  a t  any N.E. of  t h e  r-subgame ps # p s l  f o r  
s # s t .  For  t h e n  w e  c a n  s imply  set  
t o  o b t a i n  (ii) .
The e x i s t e n c e  o f  O ( r , e , i )  i n  t u r n  i s  proved by r o u g h l y  t h e  
f o l l o w i n g  argument.  The N.E.  of t h e  r-subgame are g e n e r i c a l l y  
f i n i t e  i n  number and v a r y  c o n t i n u o u s l y .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand,  
b  
s t r a t e g i e s  b  i n  M ( T ) ,  a t  which ps = f o r  some p a i r  s # s l ,  i s  p s  
made up o f  submani fo lds  of  codimension - > 1 .  T h e r e f o r e  t h e  N.E .  
s e t  g e n e r i c a l l y  misses M ( r )  and i t s  p r i c e s  a r e  f u l l y  r e v e a l i n g .  
To change t h i s  i n t o  a  p roof  r e q u i r e s  a r o u t i n e  u s e  of  t h e  
Transve r sa l  Densi ty  and Openness Theorems [ I ] .  Indeed f i x  e E D ,  
and cons ide r  t h e  map 
where b - t b  f o r  b E R  ( r )  , and 
-u 
* n  n  f o r  x E R a ( r )  x g a ( r ) ,  i . e . ,  it i s  t h e  p a r t i a l  d e r i v a t i v e  of n ' s  
payoff  w . r . t .  h i s  own a c t i v e  s t r a t e g y  x .  L e t  
- 
y n l x  Yn, z i f  x ,  z a r e  i n  t h e  same en Y 
-. n  
occu r r ing  i n  R, ( T )  
For b  t o  be a  p.N.E. of  uEU w e  must have D(u ,b )  E N  x R  ( r ) ;  P 
f o r  b  t o  be a  p.N.E. a t  which p r i c e s  a r e  n o t  f u l l y  r e v e a l i n g  w e  
must have D(u ,b )  €NSxM(r)  i . e .  D(u,b)  € N x ~ ~ ( r )  f o r  some i = 
1,. . . , K  where ( s i n c e  e i s  i n  g e n e r a l  p o s i t i o n )  N ( r )  = M l  ( r ) U  ... U ~ ( T )  
breaks  M(r)  i n t o  submanifolds of R ( r )  
-u 
each  of which has  codim > 1 
- 
i n  R ( T I .  The map D i s  e a s i l y  checked t o  be t r a n s v e r s e  t o  every  
-u 
submanifold of  i t s  image. T h e - f r a n s v e r s a l  Dens i ty  and Openness 
'Theorems now r e v e a l  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  an open dense  set  O ( r , e , g )  such 
t h a t  i f  u E O ( r , e , ~ )  
( a )  codim D;' ( N  x Mi ( r )  ) = codim ( N  x Mi ( r )  ) f o r  i = 1 .. .. , K ;  1 
( b )  codim D;' ( N  x ( r )  ) = codim ( N  x R ( r )  ) 
-P 
i n  R ( r )  
-P 
- 1 Since codim ( N x M i ( r ) )  > d i m  R ( T )  t h e  s e t s  D ( N x M i ( r ) )  a r e  
-lJ 
-1 
empty. And, s i n c e  codim N x R ( T )  = dim R ( T ) ,  D ( N  x R ( T ) )  has  
lJ -lJ -lJ 
dim 0 ,  i . e .  i s  a  d i s c r e t e  s e t .  But r e c a l l  t h a t  R ( T )  i s  a  neigh- 
-lJ 
borhood of R ( T )  . Hence t h e  i n t e r s e c t i o n  of t h e  d i s c r e t e  s e t  
lJ 
wi th  t h e  c l o s u r e  of  R ( T )  i s  f i n i t e ,  i . e . ,  t h e  number of N.E.  
lJ 
of t h e  T-subgame i s  f i n i t e .  
3 . 3  Completion of t h e  Proof 
We have shown t h a t  f o r  r = e u  , i f  ( e , s )  E D  and u € D ( e , G )  
then : 
(i) p r i c e s  a r e  f u l l y  r e v e a l i n g  i n  pe r iod  1 a t  any p.N.E. 
* 
of  T ( e q u i v a l e n t l y  N.E .  of  T ) 
(ii) t h e  s e t  of lSt pe r iod  moves i n  t h e  p.N.E. ' s  of  r i s  
f i n i t e .  
To s t r eng then  (ii) i n t o  f i n i t e n e s s  of p.N.E. 's  r e p e a t  t h e  argument 
used f o r  (ii) wi th  D de f ined  no t  on ly  on t h e  1 St b u t  a l s o  t h e  2nd 
* 
per iod  moves, i . e .  on s t r a t e g y  s e t s  of I' . W e  avoided doing t h i s  
i n  o rde r  n o t  t o  blow up an a l r e a d y  cumbersome n o t a t i o n .  
I t  remains t o  check t h a t  t h e  s e t  of p.N.E. of  r = N.E.  of r .  
Thi s  fo l lows  from (i) above and P ropos i t i on  5 (augmented wi th  
Remark 6 )  of [31 . 
3 . 4  Remarks 
( 1 )  We fo rced  t h e  a g e n t s  t o  pu t  up a l l  of  t h e i r  commodities f o r  
s a l e .  This  i s  no t  e s s e n t i a l .  I n  t h e  more gene ra l  "b id -o f f e r "  
model [$I t h e  same theorem would hold (by an i d e n t i c a l  argument 
b u t  twice  t h e  n o t a t i o n ) .  Adding inventory ing  a l s o  does  no t  
a f f e c t  it. I n  g e n e r a l ,  f o r  any smooth  s t ra tegic-game which i s  
1 d e t e r m i n i s t i c  i n  s p i r i t ,  i . e .  has a  f i n i t e  number of N . E . ' s  i n  I', 
' I t  t u r n s  o u t  t h a t  a  l a r g e  c l a s s  of  smooth games do y i e l d  t h i s  
when N i s  non-atomic ( s e e  [Y] ) . The argument i n  [ Y  1 i s  f o r  a  
* 
s imp le r  s e t t i n g  than  I' b u t  we suspec t  t h a t  it could be c a r r i e d  
over .  
the theorem will go through with only one extra stipulation: 
that the moves of period 1 which are not fully revealing from a 
submanifold F of codimension > 1. For then generically the N.E. 
- 
set would "miss" F. Even when the N.E. set is not finite it is 
typically a finite union of submanifolds GI, ..., Gk each of which 
has codim - > 1 ( [ 5 ] ) .  But then G. n F  will be lower dimensional 
1 
than Gi given transversal intersection. Thus "most" N.E.'s 
(those in G~\F) will still be fully revealing. The smoothness 
of the game (i.e. of the moves-to-outcome map) and the condition 
that codim F - > 1 both seem likely in any model conceived in the 
Cournotian spirit. To that extent our results are robust. 
(2) We have assumed, in the definition of an N.E., that the 
strategic choice of the agents lead to jointly measurable moves. 
This seems to go against the very spirit of a noncooperative game 
with independent decision-makers. However a model can be de- 
scribed in which measurability is restored after an initial non- 
measurable choice (see [61 ) .  This in turn makes the assumption 
more viable. 
(3) If we refined fn by allowing agents to observe (modulo null 
sets) the entire measurable function b of 1st period moves, this 
* 
would still leave the set of p.N.E. of r unaffected [See ( 3 ) l .  
4 .  SOME EXAMPLES 
I n  t h i s  s e c t i o n  s e v e r a l  examples a r e  s u p p l i e d  i n  o r d e r  t o  i l l u s -  
t r a t e  and c l a r i f y  t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n s  and problems w i t h  t h e  market  mechanism 
and t o  i l l u s t r a t e  t h e  n a t u r e  of i n f o r m a t i o n  r e v e l a t i o n .  
We imagine  t h a t  t h e r e  is  a  s e l l e r  who h a s  o f f e r e d  20 u n i t s  of a  
good f o r  s a l e  ( t h e  s p e c i f i c s  w i l l  be g iven  l a t e r ) .  I n  s t a t e  1 t h e s e  u n i t s  
a r e  of v a l u e  t o  a l l  b u y e r s ;  in s t a t e  2 t h e y  a r e  v a l u e l e s s .  
For s p e c i f i c i t y  l e t  u s  c o n s i d e r  t h a t  t h e  u t i l i t y  f o r  any i n d i v i d u a l  
i is  g i v e n  by 
1 m i  = ?A l o g  xi + w i 1 
i i 
where x1 is  t h e  amount of t h e  good o b t a i n e d  by i i n  s t a t e  1 and w 
i s  h i s  w e a l t h  i n  money. 
There i s  a  s i n g l e  market  f o r  t h e  good. We must d e s c r i b e  t h e  
mechanism i n  d e t a i l .  Fur thermore  we o b s e r v e  t h a t  t h e  uninformed b i d d e r s  
must submit  a  s t a t e  i n d e p e n d e n t  b i d  whereas  t h e  informed b i d d e r s  w i l l  
submit  s t a t e  dependen t  b i d s .  
Example 1: The Ploney @ a n t i t y  Bid Model 
The s i m p l e s t  market  c l e a r i n g  mechanism model which may b e  regarded  
a s  " u n r e a l i s t i c , "  b u t  h a s  t h e  v i r t u e  of b e i n g  w e l l - d e f i n e d  and s i m p l e  i s  
where i n d i v i d u a l s  b i d  a  f i x e d  amount of money and o b t a i n  whatevery  q u a n t i t y  
a l l o t e d  by t h e  market  p r i c e  t h a t  i s  formed. The uninformed t r a d e r s  w i l l  
b i d  a  s i n g l e  amount b  each ,  w h i l e  t h e  informed t r a d e r s  w i l l  b i d  s t a t e  
dependent  amoun ts 1 and b2 . A s  t h e  good i s  of no v a l u e  i n  s t a t e  2 
we may s e t  b 2  = G . F i g u r e s  l a  and l b  show market  c l e a r a n c e  and p r i c e  
f o r m a t i o n .  
p r i c  
FIGURE 1 
P a y o f f s  t o  informed t r a d e r s  a r e :  
where we assume t h a t  a l l  t r a d e r s  s t a r t  w i t h  ( 0 , M )  . 
The p a y o f f s  t o  un in fo rmed  t r a d e r s  a r e :  
( 3  
where 
1 n2 = 9 l o g  b/pl  - b  + M 
O p t i m i z a t i o n  g i v e s  u s  
I 
and 
Suppose A = 1 0  , we have b l O 9  b = 5 ,  pl = 314 and p2 = i/4 . 
hence 
we may l e a v e  o f f  t h e  M t o  see t h e  g a i n s  from t r a d e .  
Compet i t ion w i t h  A l l  Uninformed 
(8)  1 b = -A l o g  - - b + M f o r  a14 t r a d e r s  2 P1 
Compet i t ion  w i t h  A l l  Informed 
( 9 )  1 b + M f o r  a l l  t r a d e r s  = ? - A  l o g  - -  
i 
The m a t r i x  below shows t h e  u t i l i t y  g a i n s  a t  e q u i l i b r i u m  t r a d e  i n  
f o u r  d i f f e r e n t  games when t r a d e r s  of type  1 and 2 a r e  informed o r  unin- 
formed. 
Type 2 
Informed Uninformed 
I 
Type 1 
Uninformed  4,486,  7.951 6 ,513,  6.513 
TABLE 1 
P a y o f f s  a t  E q u i l i b r i u m  i n  Four One S tage  Ganes 
Observa t ion  1. We have shorn  by example h e r e  t h a t  i t  i s  e a s y  f o r  a  whole 
c l a s s  of smal l  t r a d e r s  t o  g a i n  from e x t r a  in format ion  even though i t  i s  
revea led  by t h e  p r i c e s  formed. 
Before  t h e  o t h e r  examples a r e  p r e s e n t e d ,  we comment b r i e f l y  upon 
o t h e r  market mechanisms. S e v e r a l  have been sugges ted .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r  
buyers  could  s p e c i f y  q u a n t i t i e s  t o  b e  bought a t  any p r i c e ,  o r  w i t h  an 
upper bound on p r i c e ;  s e l l e r s  could  announce p r i c e  i n  advance. O r  buyers  
o r  s e l l e r s  could  announce whole f u n c t i o n s  a s  s t r a t e g i e s .  
The announcing of whole f u n c t i o n s  a p p e a r s  t o  b e  f a r  l e s s  r e a l i s t i c  
than  t h e  money b i d  we have sugges ted .  But even so  i t  can b e  cons idered  
provided an e x p l i c i t  mechanism f o r  forming p r i c e  under a l l  c i rcumstances  
i s  given .  
F i g u r e s  2a and 2b i l l u s t r a t e  some of t h e  problems i n  s p e c i f y i n g  
t h e  mechanism f o r  t h e  p r i c e - q u a n t i t y  model s t u d i e d  by Shubik 
[ 10 I and Dubey [ 2 I ,  i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  of d i f f e r e n t i a l  i n f o r m a t i o n .  
1 The b i d  of t h e  informed i s  pl , x1 i n  s t a t e  1 and n o t h i n g  i n  s t a t e  2 ,  1 
q u a n t i t y  q u a n t i t y  
a  
- 
FIGURE 2 
t h e  b i d  of t h e  uninformed i s  p2x2 i n  e i t h e r  s t a t e .  The supp ly  i s  0 
2 S below p , 0 t o  20 a t  p  and above. Using t h e  conven t ions  sugges ted  
by k b e y  and Shubik p r i c e s  can b e  formed i n  each s t a t e  and q u a l i t a t i v e l y  
t h e  same r e s u l t s  c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  v a l u e  of  in fo rmat ion  can b e  e s t a b l i s h e d .  
We e x p e c t  however t o  e n c o u n t e r  r o b u s t  s e t s  of games w i t h  no e q u i l i b r i a  
and s a l e s  w i t h  d i f f e r e n t  p r i c e s  f o r  t h e  same good. 
Example 2: The Purchase  of I n f o r m a t i o n  
Nature  
FIGURE 3 
I n  t h i s  game t r e e ,  a f t e r  Nature h a s  moved any member of P2 has  t h e  cho ice  
1 
t o  pay A t o  buy i n fo rma t ion  about  Nature ' s  move. Then P2 b i d s .  P1 
i s  no t  informed of P 2 ' s  b i d  b u t  he does know i f  P2 bought in format ion  
o r  no t  (we could ~ o d e l  t h i s  t h e  o t h e r  way; e i t h e r  c a se  i s  r e a sonab l e ) .  
R e f e r r i n g  t o  Tab le  1 we cons ide r  t h r e e  ca se s :  
( 2 )  A 2 3.465 bu t  A > 2.027 
- 
Given t h a t  a l l  t r a d e r s  a r e  small, i f  a  s i n g l e  t r a d e r  of t ype  2 
were a b l e  t o  b e  informed c o s t l e s s l y  he could change h i s  payoff from 4.486 
t o  7.951, a  g a i n  of 3.465. I f  A > 3.465 i t  would n o t  pay any member 
of t ype  2 t o  buy i n fo rma t ion .  I f  A - < 3.465 then any member of t ype  2  
w i l l  f i n d  i t  prof i t a b l e  t o  buy i n fo rma t ion  and ea rn  7.951 - A  i n s t e a d  
of 4.486. But we now con f ron t  a  f a l l a c y  of composi t ion.  If a l l  o f  type 
2 buy i n fo rma t ion  t h e  game changes t o  one where a l l  t ype s  a r e  informed 
and t hey  can  o n l y  g a i n  6.513. Thus i f  A - > 2.027 = 6.513 - 4.486 it 
w i l l  no t  have pa id  a l l  t o  buy in format ion .  The pure  s t r a t e g y  equ i l i b r i um 
i s  des t royed .  
I f  A < 2.027 i t  pays a l l  members o f  type  2  t o  buy in format ion .  
Observa t ion  2 .  I f  i n fo rma t ion  i s  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  s a l e  i t  may b e  bought.  
Depending upon i t s  p r i c e  t h e  pure  s t r a t e g y  equ i l i b r i um may b e  de s t royed .  
Example 3:  A Two Stage ,  Two Trader  Model 
Observa t ion  3. I f  t h e  number of t r a d e r s  i s  f i n i t e  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  
t h e y  w i l l  choose t o  concea l  in format ion  i n  e a r l y  markets  i f  g r e a t e r  p r o f i t s  
a r e  t o  t e  made l a t e r .  I f  a l l  t r a d e r s  a r e  smal l  t h i s  w i l l  not  b e  s o  a s  
'See Shubik [19 ] f o r  a  d i s c u s s i o n  of t h e  problems i n  modeling t h e  s a l e  
of in format ion .  
each ,  i f  a c t i n g  a l o n e  c o u l d  b e n e f i t  i m e d i a t e l y  wi thou t  i n f l u e n c i n g  p r i c e ,  
b u t  i f  a l l  do s o  t h e y  d i s c l o s e  t h e i r  i n f o r m a t i o n  and l o s e  f u t u r e  b e n e f i t s .  
F i g u r e  4 shows t h e  game we s t u d y  i n  e x t e n s i v e  form. P l a y e r  1 can 
FIGURE 4 
p i c k  s t r a t e g i e s  which w i l l  d i s c l o s e  h i s  i n f o r m a t i o n ,  and by d o i n g  s o  may 
make a h i g h e r  payoff  i n  t h e  f i r s t  pe r iod .  He a l s o  h a s  t h e  c h o i c e  of a c t i n g  
a s  though he were uninformed.  By do ing  s o  he e a r n s  less i n  t h e  f i r s t  
p e r i o d  b u t  d o e s  n o t  d i s c l o s e  i n f o m a t i o n  about  t h e  s t a t e  of Nature.  
Suppose f o r  example w e  assume t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  two p e r i o d s  and t h e  
market  s t r u c t u r e  and p r e f e r e n c e s  in t h e  f i r s t  p e r i o d  a r e  a s  i n  example 1. 
I n  t h e  second p e r i o d  t h e  commodity f o r  consumption i n  s t a t e  1 is 1 0  t imes  
a s  va lued  a s  i n  t h e  f i r s t  p e r i o d .  Furthermore t h e  s u p p l y  i n  each p e r i o d  
i s  t h e  same and t h e  good canno t  b e  i n v e n t o r i e d  by t h e  consumers. The 
u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  o f  a  t r a d e r  can  be  w r i t t e n  a s :  
i 1 i 1 i i 4 = 710 l o g  Xll + -100 l o g  X12 + w 2  
i 
where x = t h e  consumption of i i n  s t a t e  s a t  t ime t . 
s t  
F i r s t  suppose t h e r e  were only one p e r i o d  w i t h  one t r a d e r  w i t h  i n -  
fo rmat ion  and one  w i t h o u t .  The payof f s  a r e  a s  f o l l o w s :  
A s  there a r e  o n l y  two t r a d e r s  they  each i n f l u e n c e  p r i c e  where 
P1 = (b +b1)/20 and p2 = b/2O . 
A l i t t l e  c a l c u l a t i o n  g i v e s  
Incomplete-Incomplete  In format ion  
I f  b o t h  were uninformed b = 512 f o r  a l l  pl = p2 = 114 
C o m ~ l e t e - C o ~ ~ l e t e  In format ion  
I f  bo th  were informed bl = 5 , b2  = 0 f o r  a l l  p = 112 1 
IT' = 5 l o g  10 - 512 n 2  = 5 l og  10 - 512 
We may c o n s t r u c t  and i n t e r p r e t  Table 2 i n  t h e  same way a s  Table  1. 
It shows t h e  duopsony s o l u t i o n s  t o  t h e  one per iod  s t r a t e g i c  market game, 
i n  c o n t r a s t  w i t h  t h e  compe t i t i ve  s o l u t i o n s  shown i n  Table 1. 
TABLE 2 
Type 2 
Informed Uninformed 
Four One S tage  Games: Duopsony Payof fs  
Informed 
Type 1 
Uninformed 
A. m u l t i p l y i n g  of t h e s e  nunbers  by 1 0  y i e l d s  t h e  payo f f s  i n  t h e  
second pe r i od  subgames. It i s  s t r a i gh t fo rwa rd  t o  observe  t h a t  i f  t he  
informed p l aye r  choose t o  e a rn  10.234 and thereby  r e v e a l  h i s  in format ion  
i n  t h e  f i r s t  pe r i od ,  he w i l l  e a r n  90.13 i n  t h e  second pe r i od .  I f ,  on the  
o t h e r  hand, he p l a y s  a s  i f  he  were uninformed i n  t h e  f i r s t  pe r i od  t h e  
t o t a l s  earned a r e  9.013 and 102.34.  The f u l l  payoff w i t h  d i s c l o s u r e  i s  
100.364 and wi thout  i s  111.353. It  i s  important  t o  n o t e  t h a t  i t  does 
n o t  m a t t e r  that t h e  p l a y e r  of t y p e  2 h o w s  t h a t  t h e  o t h e r  p l aye r  l i e s ;  
t h e r e  i s  no th ing  he can do about  i t .  He g e t s  no in format ion  on Nature. 
9.013, 9.013 
7.643, 10.234 
10.234, 7.643 
9.013, 9.013 
This  r e s u l t  is  r o b u s t ,  we cou ld  have had k  t r a d e r s  of each  t y p e ,  a s  
long  a s  e a c h  h a s  i n f l u e n c e  on p r i c e .  With a  continuum of t r a d e r s  a  s i n g l e  
i n d i v i d u a l  who i s  informed i s  tempted t o  save  money by n o t  buying worth- 
l e s s  goods i n  s t a t e  2. A l l  of them would do t h i s ,  t h e  p r i c e  would change 
and t h e  in format  i o n  would b e  s i g n a l l e d .  
Observa t ion  4. We c o u l d  e a s i l y  have in t roduced  u n c e r t a i n t y  i n  t h e  know- 
l e d g e  of t r a d e r s  of t y p e  2  concern ing  whether o r  n o t  t r a d e r s  of t y p e  1 
were informed. The game t r e e  i s  s i m i l a r  t o  t h a t  i n  F i g u r e  3 w i t h  t h e  
i n f o r m a t i o n  purchase  r e p l a c e d  by a  move of  Nature.  
Observa t ion  5. I f  t h e  p a y o f f s  had been i d e n t i c a l  i n  each  per iod  then  
t r a d e r s  of t y p e  1 vould have been i n d i f f e r e n t  between r e v e a l i n g  informa- 
t i 0 1 1  i n  p e r i o d  1 o r  2. They could  o b t a i n  10.234 + 9.013 w i t h  immediate 
r e v e l a t i o n  o r  9.013 + 10.234 w i t h  delayed r e v e l a t i o n .  
Observa t ion  6.  I f  i n f o r m a t i o n  were f o r  s a l e  i n  pe r iod  1 i t  would b e  of 
c o n s i d e r a b l e  v a l u e  and - i t s  a v a i l a b i l i t y  and no t  t h e  p r i c e  mechanism cou ld  
promote r e v e l a t i o n .  A r e a s o n a b l e  model of  t h i s  would c a l l  f o r  an  e x p l i c i t  
f o r m u l a t i o n  of t h e  " t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s "  of t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  and i t s  speed of  
d i f f u s i o n ,  i . e .  how f a s t  can peop le  buy i t  and a c t  upon i t .  S e r v i c e s  
such a s  D i s c l o s u r e  I n c o r p o r a t e d  i n d i c a t e  t h e  importance of t h i s  f o r  ob- 
t a i n i n g  S.E.C. f i l i n g s .  
Observa t ion  7 .  I f  t h e  u t i l i t y  of t h e  consumer good were a d d i t i v e  a c r o s s  
i i p e r i o d s  f o r  example O(xsl +xS2)  and i f  i t  were p o s s i b l e  t o  inven tory  
t h e  good, depending upon supp ly  c o n d i t i o n s  in t h e  two p e r i o d s ,  f o r  a  f i n i t e  
number of t r a d e r s ,  r e v e l a t i o n  w i l l  o r  w i l l  not  t a k e  p l a c e  i n  t h e  f i r s t  
p e r i o d .  For a  continuum t h e r e  w i l l  b e  f i r s t  pe r iod  r e v e l a t i o n .  
We s u g g e s t  t h a t  o u r  o b s e r v a t i o n s  pose  no paradoxes .  They do i n d i -  
c a t e  t h a t  f u r t h e r  work may r e q u i r e  (1) e x p l i c i t  c a r e  i n  fo rmula t ing  t h e  
f u n c t i o n i n g  of  marke t  mechanisms, ( 2 )  t h e  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  of t h e  r e l a t i v e  
speeds  of i n f o r m a t i o n  d i f f u s i o n  and market r e a c t i o n ,  ( 3 )  t h e  modeling of 
t h e  s a l e  of i n f o r m a t i o n  and i t s  e v a l u a t i o n ,  (4 )  t h e  f a c i n g  up t o  t h e  pos- 
s i b i l i t y  t h a t  t h e  assumption of t h e  continuum of t r a d e r s  i s  merely  a. 
mathemat ica l  convenience which a l l o w s  u s  t o  o b t a i n  some i n s i g h t s  of i n t e r e s t ,  
b u t  i s  of l i m i t e d  a p p l i c a t i o n  as an approximat ion t o  many of t h e  phenomenon 
of i n t e r e s t .  
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